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This paper explores the role of social integration on altruistic behavior. To this aim, we develop a two-
stage experimental protocol based on the classic Dictator Game. In the first stage, we ask a group of 
77 undergraduate students in Economics to elicit their social network; in the second stage, each of 
them has to unilaterally decide over the division of a fixed amount of money to be shared with another 
anonymous member in the group. Our experimental design allows to control for other variables 
known to be relevant for altruistic behavior: framing and friendship/acquaintance relations. 
Consistently with previous research, we find that subjects favor their friends and that framing 
enhances altruistic behavior. Once we control for these effects, social integration (measured by 
betweenness, a standard centrality measure in network theory) has a positive effect on giving: the 
larger social isolation within the group, the more likely it is the emergence of selfish behavior. These 
results suggest that information on the network structure in which subjects are embedded is crucial to 
account for their behavior. 
The so-called “Dictator Game” is a classic experimental protocol in which a subject (the “Dictator”) is invited 
to decide unilaterally over the division of a fixed amount of money with another -usually anonymous- subject 
(the “Recipient”).1-5 The anonymity of the protocol may suggest that dictators may well keep all the money for 
themselves. However, this kind of selfish behaviour is rarely observed. In contrast, around 20% of the money 
is given to the recipient (this result being robust to a wide variety of experimental conditions) and such positive 
transfers are usually interpreted as an instance of altruistic behavior. This outcome is just an example of a more 
general observation: humans tend to behave cooperatively towards other unknown individuals. Some of the 
factors affecting the level of altruism (repeated interaction and reputation, among others) are now well 
understood.10-13 However, it remains a level of cooperation that apparently cannot be explained by any of those 
variables. 
This paper adds a new dimension to this discussion by exploring the role of social integration (measured by the 
degree of social proximity between subjects) on giving, that is, the effect of socialization on altruism. In recent years, 
a large number of Dictator Game experiments have focused on several social aspects, such as the degree of 
anonymity in the Dictator-Recipient and the Dictator-Experimenter relationships, induced by the experimental 
conditions, that may play a role as determinants of giving.1-9 This literature unambiguously shows that the 
smaller the (social) distance between the parties involved, the larger the giving. 
This evidence notwithstanding, to the best of our knowledge little attention has been paid to social network 
relationships to explain giving.14-15 Our paper opens a novel line of research by exploring how the social 
network in which experimental subjects are embedded is related with their attitude to give. To this aim, we 
design a two-stage experiment in which, before being exposed to a standard Dictator Game, we ask subjects to 
elicit the social network characterizing their undergraduate class. Results are conclusive: on average, more central 
(i.e. highly integrated within the network) players give more, whereas the number of selfish “key players” is 
marginal. By the same token, “isolated” players behave selfishly, and subjects with a low degree of integration 
rarely show altruistic behavior. 
EXPERIMENTAL  CONDITIONS.  The experiment was conducted at the University of Granada (Spain) in 
January 2006. Subjects were first-year undergraduate students in Economics. Participation was voluntary. Given 
the high sensitivity to framing effects in this kind of experiments, we were extremely careful in preserving 
subjects-experimenter distance. To this aim, the experiment was conducted by assistants who did not have any 
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  1previous contact with the students (see the webpage http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/material/intro.htm for a detailed 
description of the experimental design and additional material). 
STAGE 1: A “benefit-your-friend” Incentive Device for Network Elicitation. The protocol for network elicitation was 
extremely simple: subjects were asked to write down on a piece of paper the name of their classmate friends 
who “may have the chance to be benefited later in the experiment”. At this stage, no information was provided about the 
type of decisions they would make afterwards, or what the possible benefit would be. However, since we were 
interested in subjects revealing the identity of their closest friends, the instructions clearly stated that they might be 
given the chance to benefit only one of the friends, randomly chosen within their list, so that the more friends 
they had listed, the lower the chance of benefiting any particular individual. Despite its simplicity, we obtained 
an average of 50.5% of corresponded links, that is, an extremely accurate mapping of social correspondences, 
when compared with more sophisticated protocols used for analogous purposes.14
STAGE 2: Dictator Game. Subjects received two 11.5x22 cm. (4.5x8.8 inch.) envelopes in their hand-out package. 
One envelope was empty, the other contained ten 50 eurocent coins. Subjects were informed that their task 
was to divide this endowment of 10 coins between them and another subject in whatever way they wished. 
Then, depending on the treatment, they knew from the instructions whether the recipient would be a friend 
taken from their own list (treatment “Friends” in Box 1) or someone from their class with the exception of their 
named friends (treatment “No Friends”). 
We also controlled for another experimental condition, framing, 
which has been the object of interest in experimental research.1-3 
Again, the protocol was remarkably simple: one half of the 
subjects who were facing a no-friend as Recipient, had an 
additional sentence framing the Dictator Game by stating that 
the Recipient “…would rely on them...”. 
 
 Frame  No  Frame 
Friends     27 
No Friends  25  25 
    
Box 1. Observations per treatment 
 
RESULTS. To simplify the exposition and the comparison with other related papers, our results are presented 
in terms of the number of coins (from 0 to 10) chosen by the Dictator in favor of the Recipient. Fig. 1 reports 
the giving distributions in the three treatments: Baseline (i.e. “No Friends-No Framing”), Framing and Friends. 
While average behavior is more selfish in the baseline, the other two treatments exhibit a (significant) increase 
in altruism, with behavior more disperse in the Friend treatment. 
  
 
Fig 1. Distribution of giving in the three experimental conditions. 
“Box plot” graphic analysis. Within the box lie 50% of total 
observations (from the 25% to the 75% percentile). 
Adjacent lines trace the first upper and lower adjacent 
values; points denote outliers. Line within the box highlights 
the median. The broken red line connects the means of the 
three distributions. The first box shows observations on the 
Dictator Game from our Baseline (i.e. No Friend-No Frame) 
treatment. In this case, the Dictator keeps, on average, 8 
coins for her and passes out only 2 to the Recipient. This 
result is in line with analogous experiments.2-5 Very few 
subjects (3 out of 25) shared equally the €5; only 4 
individuals behaved completely selfish, that is, kept all the 
money for themselves. The central box illustrates the 
Framing case. As Fig. 1 shows, the use of sentences framing the game enhances altruistic behavior, as the whole distribution 
“shifts” up, compared with the Baseline treatment. As a consequence, equal splitting becomes much more frequent (20% of 
total observations). The third box shows the giving distribution for the Friend treatment. In this case, average offers further 
increase, together with their variability: 25% of subjects pass (at least) half of the endowment, another 25% behave 
completely selfishly. Summing up, our two experimental treatments significantly enhance giving compared to the control 
condition, while we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in giving between our  “Framing” and “Friends” 
treatments (standard t-statistics, p=.85).  
 
Stage 1 provides us with a mapping of the directed network (i.e. a network in which each link has a direction, 
from the eliciting to the elicited subject) of our experimental subject pool. The use of the “benefit-you-friend” 
incentive device yields a network of close-friends, to the extent to which subjects were aware of the potential 
drawbacks of naming too many friends. As a result, on average subjects named 2.7 friends (mode=3), which is 
lower than the values obtained in related works.14 Five individuals did not name anybody, but other subjects 
  2named up to 11 individuals; some of these individuals did not come to play the Dictator Game in Stage 2, but 
they are included in the dataset because they are a relevant to define the network. 
In what follows, we shall apply a standard measure in network theory to test our working hypothesis that 
altruism is (positively) correlated with social integration. Among the classic measures provided by the literature,15-16 we 
focus on the so-called betweenness centrality. Loosely speaking, betweenness centrality measures, for each 
individual, the relative frequency, among all shortest paths which connect any pair of subjects in the network, 
of paths which pass through that particular individual. In other words, betweenness is an index which measures 
how central is the individual within the network (or, the impact on the connection structure were that particular 
person be removed from the network –see the webpage for technical details). 
Fig. 2 reports, together with the mapping of social relations derived from Stage 1, information about individual 
contribution with respect to the treatment median. A close inspection of Fig. 2 provides some intuition of our 
main result: a) more isolated subjects are more likely to give less; or b) more integrated subjects are more likely 
to be on or over the median of their corresponding treatment.  
 























Elicited social links connect individuals in the network with an arrow (in the direction of the elicited friend). Each individual 
participating in Stage 1 is a diamond, whose color highlights  w h e t h e r  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  g a v e  m o r e  o r  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  
corresponding treatment median. This figure maps into the social network subjects giving more than the treatment median, 
that is “altruists” (27 subjects), and subjects giving less that the median, that is “selfish” (26 individuals). Those subjects 
who were named by others but did not participate in Stage 2 are colored in grey.  
 
Fig. 3 explores the effect of betweenness on the willingness to give. As the box-plots show, the higher the 
group level of betweenness, the more giving distribution shifts up. 
Clearly, the analysis in Fig. 3 does not properly account for treatment conditions. To fix this problem, in Tab. 1 
we estimate a standard order Probit regression, in which the probability of any possible level of giving (from 0 
to 10) is regressed against individual betweenness and treatment conditions. While the estimated coefficient 
associated to the “Low” reference group is positive, but not significant (indicating that there is no significant 
difference in average contribution between Peripheral and Low subjects), the coefficient for the Central group 
is statistically significant (coeff.. 0.51, p-value=.076), which means that centrality matters. Not surprisingly, both 
treatment conditions (with particular reference with Friends) are positive and significant. In sum, the regression 
analysis provides evidence that individuals who are central in their social network have a more altruistic 
behavior even after controlling for framing and friendship effects. 
There is a caveat here. Our statistical exercise of Tab. 1 fixes a causal relation between altruism and network 
centrality, insofar we use betweenness within the list of regressors. This is consistent with the fact that the 
decision of giving is made after the network elicitation Stage 1 and, most likely, we can consider the social 
network depicted in Fig. 2 already well established at the time subjects had to make their contribution decision. 
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Fig. 3. Network integration and giving. Figure 3a) partitions our subject pool in three subsamples, depending on their level of 
individual betweenness. The first 29 subjects are not integrated at all (Peripheral), as their betweenness is equal to zero. The 
remaining 48 subjects are partitioned in two groups of equal size (24 subjects each) low-integrated and central-players. In Fig. 
3a) each subject is represented by a bar, whose height equals the corresponding level of betweenness centrality. By analogy 
with Fig. 2, the color of each bar identifies the level of each individual contribution with respect to the treatment median. 
 
 
Figure 3b) shows, again with the aid of box plots, the distribution of giving in the three subsamples. As the diagram shows, 
giving increases with integration (all mean differences are significantly different). 
 
On the other hand, the basic question remains: are subjects (on average) more altruistic because they are pivotal in their 
social network, or are they central exactly because they show (for whatever reason) a more altruistic attitude toward the rest of the 
group? To answer this question, a more detailed investigation on which (demographic, social or psychological) 
characteristics are correlated with our network centrality measure, something we cannot do with our limited 
experimental evidence. What is clear is that our results unambiguously show that the social network 
architecture has to be included within the list of determinants of our subjects’ behavior. 
 
 
Tab. 1. Ordered Probit analysis. Estimated probability of any particular contribution as a function of betweenness reference 
group (Low, Central) and treatment conditions (Friend, Framing). All regressors are dummies. A dummy variable for 
individuals belonging to the “Peripheral” reference group is omitted, to avoid perfect collinearity in the data. In this respect, 
estimated coefficients have to be interpreted as difference in the probability of giving with respect to the benchmark (i.e. 
Peripheral) reference group. We do not 
need to take into account for treatment 
interactions, as we get data out of a block 
design (with three treatment conditions out 
of four, see Box 1). 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. z P>z
Low .3309 .3003 1.10 0.270
Central .5190 .2929 1.77 0.076
Friends .8424 .3065 2.75 0.006












DISCUSSION. This paper explores a new aspect on the determinants of altruistic behaviour: social integration. 
Most of previous experimental literature has focused on economic incentives, reputation effects, framing or 
between-subject relations to explain altruism. Altruism may be driven by self-interest and it has been shown 
that reputation, or the promise of future rewards, do indeed affect generosity. Framing effects and between-
subject relations are also important factors for altruism (as our experiment confirms). However, the puzzle is 
that, even when all these factors have been accounted for, there is still some human cooperation that remains 
unexplained.  Some work has pointed to socialization and cultural transmission of social values as a solution to 
this puzzle. There is experimental evidence with children showing that younger children are less 
generous/cooperatives in the dictator/public good games.18-19 These results could be due to the fact that older 
  4children are more advanced in their socialization process and, in consequence, show a more altruistic 
behaviour. Along these lines, our research explores the idea that social integration may also be an important 
determinant for altruism. Note that this hypothesis is consistent with the evidence on children playing the 
dictator game since older children also have, on average, a higher level of social capital. However, since 
socialization and transmission of values is more complex process, rather than just social capital accumulation, 
we test our hypothesis with subjects at the same stage of the socialization process but, nonetheless, with 
different centrality positions in their social network. The results are clear: social integration is related to 
altruistic behaviour. Our results do not exclude other preference-based explanations, like inequity aversion, 
which are well supported by the experimental evidence. Nevertheless, as we previously argued, there is no 
obvious link between preferences for fairness or inequity, and centrality within a social network so that social 
integration appears as an independent factor explaining altruism. Social integration, measured as centrality 
within the social network, is a feature distinctly human11-13  which could explain why humans show a 
cooperative behaviour towards other individuals with no genetic relation to them, while this behaviour is not 
observed in other animals. 
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